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SHAKESPEARE E O DIREITO
Vera Karam de Chuein
RESUMO: Este trabalho pretende, a partir de O Mercador de Veneza de Shakespeare, 
mostrar que uma nova maneira de se pensar o direito e a justiça deve levar em conta a 
imaginação literária, sublinhando, justamente, a cumplicidade que há entre o direito, a 
filosofia e a literatura. A filosofia e a teoria do direito devem não só pressupor, mas estarem 
comprometidas com as tramas que estão na base das suas problematizações. Shylock não 
perdoa o intrépido, embora melancólico mercador e reivindica o seu direito (seu contrato). 
Que direito? O que é o direito? Shylock e Antonio, judeu e cristão, agiota e mercador, 
ambos demandam justiça. Que justiça? E o que é a justiça? Como se pode observar, a prosa 
filosófica tradicional não é a única linguagem para as, intrincadas questões que são 
enfrentadas na esfera da filosofia e da teoria do direito. Tais questões podem surgir da 
emoção e da complexidade dos versos (e da prosa) shakespearianos.
SHAKESPEARE AND THE LAW* *
Shylock. ... The pound of flesh which I 
demand of him
Is dearly bought, is mine, and I will have it. 
If you deny me, fie upon your law!
There is no force in the decrees of Venice.
* Doutora em  Filosofia -  New School for Social 
Research, Prof.3 A ssisten te  de Teoria do Estado e 
Direito C o n stitu c io n a l, D epartam en to de D ireito  
Público, Faculdade de Direito, UFPR.
** Este trabalho foi originalm ente escrito para o 
seminário Justice,  Perjury  and Forgiveness  com  o 
professor Jacques Derrida no semestre de outono de 
1999 na GF da N ew  S ch oo l for S ocia l R esearch,
I stand for judgment. Answer; shall I have it? 
(Act IV, scene i)
Shylock. My deeds upon my head! I crave 
the law,
The penalty and forfeit of my bond. (Act IV, 
scene i)
Shakespeare (The Merchant of Venice)
NY. Posteriorm ente, foi apresentado na conferência  
de p rim avera  da N ew  York C o lle g e  E n g lish  
A s so c ia t io n , em  abril de 2 0 0 1 , na St. J o h n ’s 
University, Q ueens, NY, com  o título The Merchant  
o f  Venice: (de)constructing Shakespeare or talking  
about philosophy, law, literature and justice.
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INTRODUCTION
“My deeds upon my head! I crave the 
law,” says Shylock to the “judge” (Portia) in 
a Venetian Court of Justice, referring to the 
penalty and forfeit of his bond, that is, a 
pound of flesh to be cut and taken from 
Antonio, the merchant (of Venice). Shylock 
is a man who speaks, (and through his speech 
he forwards the plot): “if you deny me, fie 
upon your law! There is no force in the 
decrees of Venice!”
Martha Nussbaum, at the very beginning 
of her book Love ’s Knowledge, writes that: 
“there may be some views of the world and 
how one should live in it -  views, especially, 
that emphasize the world’s surprising variety, 
its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed 
and imperfect beauty -  that cannot be fully 
and adequately stated in the language of 
conventional philosophical prose, a style 
remarkably flat and lacking in wonder -  but 
only in a language and in forms themselves 
more complex, more allusive, more attentive 
to particulars.”1 Indeed, I could not start this 
paper otherwise but with Shakespeare’s 
verses (and Shylock’s claim): “My deeds 
upon my head! I crave the law!” Shylock 
States the subject matter of this work: we are 
bound by this com plicity  betw een 
philosophy and lite ra tu re ,2 and, m ore
1 NUSSBAUM , M. L o ve s  Knowledge. New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. p.3.
2 B loom  has a d ifferen t understanding w ith  
w hich I do not agree. A ccord in g  to him , literary  
study d oes not depen d  upon p h ilo so p h y  and he 
defends the autonomy o f aesthetic in order to stress 
the “auton om y o f  im a g in a tiv e  literature and the 
sovereignty o f the solitary soul, the reader not as a 
person in society  but as the deep self, our ultimate
inwardness.” BLOOM, H. The Western Canon. New  
York: Harcourt Brace & Com pany, 1994. p. 10-11.
specifically, between philosophy, law and 
literature. Paradoxically (and unfortunately), 
my discussion here is mostly in flat, conventional 
philosophical prose; nevertheless, it aims at 
showing that a new ‘way’ for (re)thinking law 
and justice (in the realm of legal philosophy) 
has to take into account the literary. 
im agination by stressing the complicity 
between law and literature. Legal philosophy 
and legal theory have not only to presuppose 
but also to be committed to the crisscrossings 
and interweavings that are at the very basis 
of their concerns.
Shylock does not forgive the intrepid yet 
melancholic merchant and claims the law (his 
bond). What law? And, what is the law? 
Shylock and Antonio, Jew and Christian, 
moneylender and merchant, both demand 
justice. What justice? And, what is justice? 
As we can see, the flatness of conventional 
philosophical prose is not the only language 
for the intricate issues we face in the realm of 
jurisprudence. Such issues can also arisxe from 
the excitem ent and com plexity  of 
Shakespeare’s verse (and prose).
For instance, in The Merchant o f Venice 
verses give the rhythm of love (and the 
rhythm of hate), “in a ‘high’ formal poetry 
w hich is alm ost m usic” ;3 verses judge 
Antonio (and Shylock). Chats, jokes, and 
business are in prose. Servants and clowns 
are prosaic types. As we know, verse and 
music are based on measures of time. In a 
certain  sense, Shakespeare needs this 
measurable time in order to say that time is
3 YORK NOTES. The Merchant o f  Venice. London 
and Essex: York Press and Longman, 1998, p.51.
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out of jo in t.4 He thus anticipates a very 
modern and anguishing dilemma: the need 
for an irreversible time (which is inscribed in 
the beat o f his verses), the need for 
consistency to show the inconsistency, the 
reversals, of time (which are inscribed in 
the content of his verses). As Derrida nicely 
puts it: “Voici le coupe de génie, Tinsigne 
trait d ’esprit, la signature de la Chose 
“Shakespeare autonser chacune traductions, 
les rendres possibles et intelligibles sans 
jamais s ’y rédruire.
Therefore, it is necessary to (re)assure 
what is, on the one hand, the obvious subject 
matter of this paper: we are impelled by this 
complicity between philosophy, law, and 
literature. On the other hand, when we come 
to the (de)construction of this complicity, 
either in the conventional prose of legal 
philosophy or in the dramatic narrative of 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant o f Venice, we 
have already left the realm of the obvious to, 
perhaps, the most intricate (and challengeable) 
task. My argument, then, begins here.
I will recount the story of Shakespeare’s 
The M erchant o f  Venice. To paraphrase 
Nikulin,6 recounting Shakespeare’s The 
Merchant o f Venice “may be especially 
helpful when rigidly established limits
4 'Hamlet.  (. .. )  The time is out o f  joint. ( . . . ) ” 
(scene V, act i) See SH AK ESPEARE. Hamlet.  New  
York: Signet C lassic, 1982.
5 DERRIDA, Spectres  de Marx. Paris: G alilée,
1993, p .47.
6 In a paper entitled Mikhail Bakhtin: A Theoiy  
of D ialogue,  N ik u lin  poin ts out that Bakhtin “ is
infinitely rich and so may be especially helpful when 
rigidly established limits between academic disciplines 
and fields of study are redefined or put into question.” 
NIKULIN, Dimitri. Constellat ions  5, 1998, p.381.
between academic disciplines and fields of 
study are redefined or put into question.” 
However, the paper is about (n)either 
Shakespeare (n)or The Merchant o f Venice. 
As Derrida points out, “under the pretext of 
fic tion , litera tu re  m ust be able to say 
anything; in other words, it is inseparable 
from the human rights, from the freedom of 
speech, etc.”7
My reading of the play will focus on three 
aspects: identity, law, and justice. This 
approach is more or less arbitrary. I believe 
that legal philosophy has to look beyond 
the ‘fictional and ideal’ concept of legal 
subject inherited from legal positivism in 
order to (re)think law and justice. Thus, 
(re)introducing a reflection on who one (we) 
is (are) in and to legal philosophy is crucial 
to (re)thinking law and justice themselves. 
My special interest is in the ambiguities and 
uncertainties that constitute identity, law, and 
justice and the deconstructive attitude that 
makes such reading possible.
SHAKESPEARE’ S THE MERCHANT OE 
VENICE, VERSE, AND PROSE
Identity
“I have much ado to know myself,” says 
Antonio to his fellows/friends Salerio and 
Solanio at the very beginning of The 
Merchant o f Venice. Antonio’s very first 
words are of melancholia: “in sooth I know 
not why I am so sad.” The narrative flows 
through the rhythm of Antonio’ s consternation
7 DERRIDA, Jacques. Remarks on deconstruction 
and pragmatism. In: MOUFFE, Chantal. Pragmatism  
a n d  d e c o n s t r u c t io n .  N ew  York and L ondon: 
R ou tledge, 1996, p .80.
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and sadness, but it is in the end of his speech 
that we find what bothers him: he has “much 
ado to know” himself. There we are, with 
Antonio, facing perhaps the most onerous 
question one can face: the question of 
identity. The adjective onerous is not applied 
by chance here, since we soon realize that 
the measure of what we are, a pound of flesh 
“to be cut and taken,” will assume the value 
of three thousand ducats.
Almost ali Shakespearean dramas raise 
the question of identity, which we ask (with 
the character): ‘who am (are) I (we)?’ Peter 
Brook, in a talk in Berlin, said that through 
Shakespeare’s poetry it is possible to “reach 
into those strange tunnels where ali one’s 
experiences are buried w aiting  to be 
revived.”8 While we don’t have access to the 
whole of our lives, Shakespeare’s characters 
dare to have it, and then they inevitably ask: 
“who am I?” Antonio’ s first words direct our 
attention to what is both essential and 
dramatic: the question of identity and its 
‘strange tunnels.’
The Merchant ofVenice is a drama whose 
narrative, from its very beginning, ties the 
characters (and readers) into a troublesome 
web of literary form and philosophical 
content. And Shakespearean dramas are like 
that: a web in which the characters (and we) 
involve them- (our)selves, somehow weaving 
their (our) identity. To be dram atic in 
Shakespeare is to experience the limits of (our) 
involvement/entanglement in webs/plots. 
Limits that at the same time define a genre of 
writing and a literary form -  drama -  define
8 BROOK, Peter. Evoking Shakespeare.  London: 
N ick Hern B ooks, 1998, p. 14.
what one (we) is (are). In Shakespeare, ‘being’ 
and ‘becom ing’ are either form ally or 
materially fundamental. With regard to their 
form, being and becoming are either verbs in 
the present participle expressing a continuing 
action or nouns: the ‘being’ (in plot) or the 
‘becoming’ (entangled) which mean -  now 
moving to their content -  the dramatic.
As can be seen, drama is somehow special 
inasmuch as it demands a performance to 
arrive at a full interpretation of its meaning. 
Action and above ali conflict are implied in 
the very idea of drama. It is not by chance 
that the dramatic is formally expressed by 
the present participle, which necessarily 
performs an action: ‘being’ or ‘becoming.’ 
And what can be more dramatic than this 
experience of being or becoming?
Dram atic situations can evade their 
conflic tual nature no m ore than their 
dialogical structure.9 When the character 
asks/reflects about his/her identity, he/she 
immediately faces a conflict and a dialogue 
is performed either with the self or with 
another (different from the self). The dialogue 
performed with the self when one engenders 
areflective attitude; when one’s T  questions 
his/her own identity, he/she questions the 
identity of the other. Nevertheless, even 
addressing the other, the motivation remains 
the same: it is “much ado to know myself.” 
Harold Bloom remarks that “Shakespeare 
from Falstaff on, adds to the function of
9 As Nikulin remarks on Bakhtin about Dostoevsky 
“Even if  com m unication is p o ssib le  only through  
dialogue, and even if this implies the em ergence o f a 
certain com m on ground, this com m on ground may 
be extremely antagonistic and conflictual. That is why
in Dostoevsky dialogue usually has tragic overtones.”
See NIKULIN, Constellations, 5, (1998): 393.
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imaginative writing, which was instruction 
in how to speak to others, the now dominant 
if more melancholic lesson of poetry: how to 
speak to ourselves.”10
The enchantment of the Shakespearean 
drama -  the enchantment we find in the 
encounter of different characters such as 
Antonio and Shylock -  lies in its conflictual 
structure. This encounter paradoxically and 
dramatically does not approximate them 
' except when it accuses their solitude. Suddenly, 
we realize that our enchantment, excitement, 
pleasure (and fear) are the least sensations 
we experience when we abandon the 
language of conventional philosophical 
prose to the language of Shakespeare’s drama.
As we can see, the flatness of conventional 
philosophical prose no longer dominates and 
translates the issues this paper intends to 
discuss; rather, they arise from the excitement 
and complexity of Shakespearean verse 
(and prose).
The Merchant is a narrative, dramatic in 
its essence, and this quality of dramatic is the 
experience of what ‘being’ or ‘becoming’ is.
Shylock . . . .  I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? 
Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, 
senses, affections, passions?-fed with the 
same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject 
to the same diseases, healed by the same 
means, warmed and cooled by the same winter 
and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, 
do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not 
laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And 
if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?(...) 
(Act III, scene i)11
10 BLOOM, Harold. The Western Canon.  N ew  
York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994, p.49.
11 We can hear in S h ylock’s speech a claim  for 
what is now understood as the equal protection o f  
the laws.
To be more precise and conceptually 
attentive, it is the plot that really carries the 
dramatic in Shakespeare. While a narrative 
is only a succession of events, a plot is the 
dramatic arrangement of incidents “in a form 
having closely  reciprocai rela tions or 
reflexive reference.”12 However, Shakespeare 
usually (and engenously) sacrifices (and 
somehow subverts) the logic of the plot, 
technically understood as “essentially a 
spatial constrict, a design of events, with a 
casual scheme for beginning, middle and 
end ,” 13 for psychic crisis. According to 
Sypher: “the Shakespearian play is often an 
arena where the theatrical time of plot is at 
discord with the psychic time we have called 
duration.”14 The really dramatic measure of 
a Shakespearean play is the psychic or 
durative tempo.
Thus, when I claim that the dramatic in 
Shakespeare is this experience of ‘being’ (in 
plot) or ‘becoming’ (entangled), I have in 
mind this plot whose time can be the time of 
discontinuities or reversals -  a time, or rather 
a tempo, that is dramatic because it cannot 
be accommodated at the logic of the plot, 
which is sequential and demands a linear and 
chronological time. “The psychic drama is 
lived in discontinuous crises; in contrast to 
the theatrical sequence of plot the times are 
always out of joint and tempo instead of time 
becomes an index of experience.”15
12 SY PH E R , The e th ic  o f  time.  N ew  York: A 
C ontinuum  B ook , 1976, p .8.
13 Ibid., p .44.
14 Ibid ., p .4 3 -4 4 .
15 Ibid., p .46.
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In Tíie Merchant, the time of the “comedy” 
can be seen as the temporal sequence towards 
a happy ending. From a certain point of view, 
this is what really happens: a happy ending. 
But to say this is, at least, too simplistic. A time 
of ambiguities, of uncertainties, is inscribed 
in The Merchant and experienced either by 
Antonio or Shylock, for whom the play does 
not have the conventional happy ending of 
Elizabethan comedy. The happy ending of 
Bassanio and Portia, Lorenzo and Jessica, 
Gratiano and Nerissa, does not arrive for 
Antonio and Shylock. One can argue that a 
happy ending is reached in the case of the 
“stranger, misbeliever, cutthroat dog, kind of 
devil, unfeeling, harsh” Jew: the loss of his 
daughter, of his fortune and of his faith in the 
authority of the law. But, to accept this is to 
accept the conventional. Nevertheless, what 
about the ambiguities and uncertainties that 
do not follow the linearity of the comedic 
plot? On the one hand, such ambiguities and 
uncertainties lead us to question the identity 
of the play as a comedy. But, on the other 
hand, this does not mean that the ‘tragedy’ 
we may identify in the play necessarily 
implies an unhappy and a miserable end for 
either the Jew or the merchant. Furthermore, 
either a happy or an unhappy ending is a 
conventional demand, a demand of the logic 
of the plot; we have to turn our attention, 
rather, to the tragic elements of the play, where 
a rebellion “against the consistency of 
character and logic of plot”16 occurs.
So, to say that The Merchant is not a 
comedy is not simply to accept it as a tragedy.
16 Ibid.,  p .4 7.
It is to stress its subversive time, for instance, 
the m elancholic tim e that crosses and 
inscribes itself in Antonio’s life as well as in 
the plot, frustrating a conventional happy 
ending. Concerning the latter (a happy 
ending), we suddenly realize that Antonio, 
despite being the merchant of Venice, is there, 
in Belmont, a place to which he does not belong, 
a place that intensifies his estrangement by 
being the world of possible love. As Heller 
says; “if one were there in the familiar place 
and not here in an alien strange world, one 
would be filled with joy and happiness.”17 
And as we can see, at the end of the play, 
despite the verdict of the trial, when Antonio 
gives voice to his soul in Belmont, we hear 
the loyal, friendly, yet melancholic merchant:
Antonio. I am tlr unhappy subject of these
quarrels. (Act V, scene i)
Antonio. I once did lend my body for his wealth, 
Which but for him that had your husband’s ring 
Had quite miscarried. I dare be bound again, 
My soul upon the forfeit, that your lord 
Will never more break faith advisedly. 
(Act V, scene i)
There is not much enthusiasm in Antonio 
even when he refers to the return of his ships:
Antonio. Sweet lady, you have given me life 
and living!
For here I read for certain that my ships 
Are safely come to road. (Act V, scene i)
‘Life and living' in a world where he is destined 
to play a part, and that sad one. The defeat of 
Shylock has been in a way the cause of his
17 H ELLER , A g n es. A T heory  o f  Moclèrnity.  
M alden, M ass. and O xford, UK: B lack w ell, 1999, 
p .194.
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defeat as well, for it has deprived him of the 
one great gesture of love which would have 
ended his loneliness and crowned his love with 
one splendid act. Now he is left with his wealth 
and his loneliness. surrounded by the lovers 
and received by Portia at Belmont with words 
as full of warmth and feeling as those receiving 
Shylock into the fold of the Church:18
Portia. Sir. grieve you not -  you are welcome 
notwithstanding. (Act V. scene i)
Perhaps Antonio still feels the same 
dramatic disquiet that he expressed to his 
friends Salerio and Solanio at the beginning 
of the play. It still bothers him who he is. 
Not the Christian, nor the wealthy, friendly, 
and generous merchant of Venice, but he, 
Antonio, a man that is strange to himself and 
whose sense of belonging is remote: it is far 
from Venice or Belmont; it is somewhere that 
he is not able to reach and recognize as far as 
he does not know himself.
The ambiguous characters of Antonio and 
Shylock, the ambiguous identity of the play 
that moves between comedy and tragedy, 
show that in a Shakespearean drama nothing 
is simply there, even when it seems to simply 
be: “There are more things in heaven and 
earth, Horatio.. says Hamlet (Act I, scene 
v). By not being simply there, I refer to 
what Sypher calls ‘illuminatioris,’ that is, 
privileged moments that subvert the plot, 
giving the very sense of what the dramatic 
is. The Merchant o f Venice is especially 
dramatic when we can see such illuminations. 
And when we come to see them (and through 
them), we realize the irony: for instance,
18 MIDGLEY, Graham. The Merchant o f Venice: 
A reconsideration. In: WILDERS (Ed.). Shakespeare:
The Merchant o f  Venice, p .205.
that (we) Christians or (we) Jews are damned. 
This is (our) faith; this is (our) fate. By the 
way, it is not Antonio nor Shylock but 
Launcelot, the utterly confused clown, who 
‘dramatically’ States:
Launcelot. (...) for truly, I think you are 
damned. There is but one hope in it that can do 
you any good, and that is but a kind of bastard 
hope neither.” (Act III, scene v)
To which Jessica replies:
Jessicci: And what kind of hope is that, I 
praythee?
And he adds:
Launcelot: Marry, you may partly hope that 
your father got you not -  that you are not the 
Jew's daughter. (Act III, scene v)
With regard to what, I ask: comedy and/ 
or tragedy?
THE (AMBIGUOUS) IDENTITY OF THE 
PLAY: TRAGEDY AND/OR COMEDY
Solanio. Not love neither? Then let us say you 
are sad
Because you are not merry; and ‘twere as easy 
For you to laugh and leap, and say you are merry 
Because you are not sad. Now by two-headed 
Janus,
Nature hath framed strange fellows in her 
time: ... (Act I, scene i)
There are tragic signs in Shakespeare’s 
comedies much as there are comic signs in his 
tragedies. The Merchant is usually understood 
as a comedy with tragic signs. But a more 
daring reading could suggest that it is a 
tragedy with comic signs. In fact, the most 
interesting thing about the play -  and one of 
its great difficulties -  dwells precisely in this 
ambiguous, Janus-faced identity. Hence, in 
order to discuss its identity, it is worth taking
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a step back to look at its origins.19 And if the 
origin is the place one or something belongs 
to or comes from, if it is home, then, in order 
to know who or what one or something is, it 
is necessary to take this step back (home).
A brief look at the origin of the story of 
The Merchant o f Venice shows that it is an 
ancient story found in religious tales from 
Persia and índia. In the western tradition, the 
Roman Law of the Twelve Tables reinforced 
tales about a bond of hum an flesh, 
prescribing that creditors could, under 
certain circumstances, divide the body of a 
debtor among themselves. This story was 
recounted through folktales and fairytales, 
which began to take literary form in the 
twelfth century. The source that is closest to 
The Merchant is Ser Giovanni Fiorentino’s 
II P ecorone , a collection of fifty tales 
published in Italy in 1558 and modeled on 
the Bocaccio’ s Decameron. It tells about two 
Venetian friends, a loan, a lady of Belmonte, 
a flesh-bond with a Jew, the lady disguised 
as a lawyer, a trial, a bridal ring, and a marriage 
at the end. There is also the thirty-second 
History of the medieval Gesta Romanorum, 
in which a choice of caskets leads to a 
marriage whose chooser is a woman. There is 
also the fourteenth story of Masuccio di 
Salerno, II Novellino, dated 1476, in which a 
daughter runs away to secretly marry a man
19 This brief remark about the origin o f  the story 
is based on the fo llow in g books: SH AK ESPEA RE, 
W. The M e r c h a n t  o f  Venice.  N ew  York: S ig n et  
C lassic  B ook s, 1997. W IL D E R S, J. S h a k e sp ea r e : 
The Merchant o f  Venice , London: M acm illan Press, 
1 999 , p .1 2 -1 3 . A nd a lso  B R O W N , J. R. The  
Merchant o f  Venice.Cambridge: Harvard University  
P ress , 1959 , p .x v i i -x x ii .  Y O R K  N O T E S , The 
Merchant o f  Venice. London: York Press, 1998.
and takes the money of her miserly father. 
A prose tale written in 1580 by Anthony 
Munday called Zelauto tells of two lovers, a 
m oney-lender, a flesh-bond, and two 
disguised ladies as lawyers. A ballad of 
Gernutus and A lexandre S ilva in ’s The 
Orator, translated from the French (probably 
by Munday), are yet more possible sources 
of the story of The Merchant.
Shakespeare was also influenced by a lost 
play called The Jew (1578), reported by 
Stephen Gosson, and by Marlowe’s play The 
Jew o f Malta, performed in 1589. Marlowe’s 
play is about a Jew whose daughter loves a 
Christian. Some critics say it mixes tragic 
farce and heartless comedy with cynical 
satire on the avarice of Christians, Turks, and 
Jews. Barabas is the smart comic villain of 
the play whose intelligence is superior to 
Christians and Turks.
The Merchant o f Venice was probably 
first perform ed some time in 1596-97. 
However, the first performance on record was 
in 1605 by the King’s Men at Court, on 
Shrove Sunday. In 1701, an adaptation of 
the play was done by George Granville, 
named The Jew o f Venice. As critic Nicholas 
Rowe wrote about the play in 1709: “THO’ 
we have seen that Play Receiv’d and Acted 
as a Comedy, and the Part of the Jew 
perfornTd by an Excellent Comedian, yet I 
cannot but think it was design’d Tragically 
by the Author.”20
In 1741, a restored version of the play 
was performed with Shylock as comic villain. 
The actor, Charles Macklin, was a distinguished
20 ROWE, N. In: W ILDERS (Ed.). Shakespeare: 
The Merchant o f  Venice, p.25.
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comedian, but his Shylock was not received 
as comic, since he stressed the Jew’ s contrasted 
passions. “(T)here is no doubt but MR . 
MACKLIN looks the part as much better than 
any other person as he plays it; in the levei 
scenes his voice is most happily suited to 
the sententious gloominess of expression 
the author intended; which, with a sullen 
solemnity of deportment, marks the character 
strongly; in his malevolence, there is a 
forcible and terrifying ferocity; in the third 
act scene, where alternate passion reign, he 
breaks the tones of utterance, and varies his 
countenance admirably.”21
Later, in the beginning of nineteenth 
century, a more humane Shylock appeared. 
In his criticism at the time, William Hazlitt 
writes that: “Shylock becom es a half- 
favourite with the philosophical part of the 
audience, who are disposed to think that the 
Jewish revenge is at least as good as Christian 
injuries.”22 In 1879 a performance with Henry 
Irving as Shylock and Ellen Terry as Portia 
ran for 250 nights. At that time The Merchant 
was seen as a romantic drama. Shylock was 
played as a persecuted Jew and Portia as a 
woman full of warmth.
A comic Shylock, a decadent bourgeois 
merchant in a red wig with only incidental 
Jewishness, appeared in the first decades of 
the twentieth century. Some critics point out 
that with the rise of National Socialism, 
Shylock was played in a more humanized 
way -  except in Germ any, of course. 
Performances of The Merchant with a less
21 GENTLEM AN, Francis. In: W ILDERS (Ed.).
Shakespeare: The M erchant o f  Venice, p .26.
22 H AZLITT , W illia n . In: W IL D E R S (E d .).
Shakespeare: The Merchant o f  Venice, p .27.
comic Shylock, less evil Jew than mere usurer, 
became more common at that time. In 1946, 
John Palmer wrote: “Shakespeare set out to 
write a comedy about a stage Jew involved 
in a grotesque story about a pound of flesh. 
But Shylock, to satisfy his author, must seem 
to act as a recognisably human being would 
behave in the given circum stances and 
Shakespeare has hnmanised him to such 
good purpose that this comic Jew has become, 
for many brilliant and sensitive critics, a 
moving, almost tragic figure.”23
As we can see, both the origin of the play 
and its stage history suggest various 
interpretations of its identity. To the question 
of The Merchant o f Venice's genre, the most 
reasonable answer is that it is (n)either a 
comedy (n)or a tragedy. The “happy” ending 
of Portia and Bassanio, Nerissa and Gratiano, 
and Jessica and Lorenzo suggests that The 
M erchant fo llow s the conventions of 
Elizabethan comedy: ali ends well! Besides 
this, the urban setting, the middle-class 
characters, their prosaic style of speech, and 
the festive atmosphere of the end of the play 
seem to reinforce its comedic aspect.
If we focus on Shylock, he can be pictured 
as a comic Jew: stubborn, obsessed and 
possessed by a single thought. In this sense, 
he is a character who takes advantage of the 
comic logic of the plot, which soon appears 
to be the opportunity for bringing him to 
life -  subverting, somehow, the logic of the 
plot itself. “The plot determines the kind of 
character which Shakespeare created; but the 
character, once created, determines everything
23 PALMER, John. Shylock. In: W ILDERS (Ed.).
Shakespeare: The M erchant o f  Venice, p. 114.
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he says or does.”24 Shylock combines the 
necessities of the plot with his “illuminations 
which exceed those necessities. As Palmer 
observes: “then comes the first intimation 
that Shakespeare, having undertaken to 
supply his audience with a com ic Jew 
committed to a barbarous enterprise, not only 
intends to make his conduct psychologically 
credib le but has already realized  in 
imagination what it means to wear the star 
of David:”2:>
Shylock. Signior Antonio, many a time and oft 
ín the Rialto you have rated me 
About my moneys and my usances.
Still have I borne it with a patient shrug,
For suff rance is the badge of ali our tribe. 
You call me misbeliever, cutthroat dog,
And spet upon my Jewish gabardine,
And ali for use of that which is mine own. 
Well then, it now appears you need my heíp. 
Go to, then. You come to me and you say, 
‘Shylock, we would have moneys’ -  you say so, 
You that did void your rheum upon my beard 
And foot me as you spum a stranger cur 
Over your threshold! Moneys is your suit. 
What should I say to you? Should I not say, 
‘Hath a dog money? Is it possible 
A cur can lend three thousand ducats?’ Or 
Shall I bend low, and in a bondman’s key, 
With bated breath, and whisp’ring humbleness, 
Say this:
‘Fair Sir, you spet on me on Wenesday last, 
You spurned me such a day, another time 
You called me dog; and for these courtesies 
I’ 11 lend you thus much moneys’? (Act I, 
scene iii)
Some commentators on the play point out 
that Shylock’s repetitive manner stresses his 
comic image, setting the comic rhythm of 
the play. He is, surely, a man who speaks, and 
through his speech he forwards the plot. But
the plot is then confounded with tragic- 
sounding speeches, like Shylock’s farewell 
to Jessica before she flees with Lorenzo.
Shylock. I am bid forth to supper, Jessica. 
There are my keys. But wherefore should I go? 
I am not bid for love -  they flatter me.
But yet Fll go in hate, to feed upon 
The prodigal Christian. Jessica my girl,
Look to my house. I am right loath to go. 
There is some iíl a-brewing towards my rest, 
For I did dream of moneybags tonight. (Act II, 
scene v)
In fact, the tragedy is in the time to come: 
in Jessica’s flight, the rebellion of Shylock’s 
flesh and blood, of ‘his girl.’ Nevertheless, 
for Palmer, the house and not Jessica stands 
at the core of Shylock’s being. The house is 
also seen as a living thing:
Shylock. To gaze on Christian foolsAvith 
varnished faces:
But stop my house ears, I mean my casamentes,
... (Act II, scene v)
The critic is of the opinion that in this 
scene Shakespeare has done no more than 
humanize the stage qualities of the comic 
Jew: “Every stroke aims at our sense of 
comedy.” Palmer also sees the scene with 
Salerio and Tubal as deliberately comic 
instead of em otionally tragic. For him, 
Shakespeare rather wants to emphasize 
Shylock’s abnormally possessive affection 
than his concerned Jewish fatherhood. What 
is taken to be the most touching, eloquent, 
and hum anizing speech of the play is, 
according to Palmer, the climax of the 
comedy, since it shows Shylock growing 
m ore hum orous “as he becom es more 
poignantly enslaved to his obsession.”26
24 Ibid., p .l 14.
25 Ibid., p. 11 8. 26 Ibid., p. 124.
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From this perspective, Shylock is a mechanical 
man who talks obsessively  and wants 
revenge: “There is something grotesque even 
in his pleading, if you tickle us, do we not 
laugh? Shakespeare was not here concerned 
-  he never is concerned -  with pleading a 
case in morality.... The comically distorted 
image of Shylock the Jew is in effect a more 
telling indictment of Christian oppression, 
though Shakespeare was not prim arily 
concerned with the aspect of the matter, than 
the fictitiously sentimentalised presentment 
of the character created for modern playgoers 
by Edmund Kean and his successors.”27 In 
fact, Palm er argues that th inking and 
performing Shylock as humanly impressive 
spoils the comedy and impairs the moral 
effect of play, which lies in the irony of the 
comic in presenting reality exposing human 
beings’ blindness to their own inconsistencies.
If we turn our attention to Antonio, we 
do not find a comic character, yet he ‘plays’ 
with the Jew (in both sense of performing 
with and contending against):
Antonio: Content in faith. I' 11 seal to such a bond,
And say there is much kindness in the Jew.
(Actl, scene iii)
Antonio and his fellows respond to the 
comic logic of the plot insofar as they oppose 
themselves to the Jew, or rather to the 
Jewishness of the Jew. Jews and Christians, 
their idiosyncrasies, their differences in faith 
and principies, are established from the 
beginning of the play as two opposite and 
opposing worlds. On the side of Christians, 
there are the gay, spendthrift young gentlemen 
of the comedies (Bassanio, Gratiano, Lorenzo)
27 Ibid., p. 126.
and Antonio, the open-handed merchant. 
On the side of Jews, there is Shylock, the 
inhuman usurer. This opposition asseverates 
the villainy of Shylock, highlighting his 
malevolence and cruelty. Its apex is the 
moment when Jessica, his flesh and blood, 
flees, leaving his house, taking his money, 
his jewelry, and his Jewish pride. Antonio 
satisfies the logic of the comedy, stressing 
Shylock’s comic villainy as well as making 
possible Bassanio, Gratiano, and Lorenzo’s 
love story and the conversion of the Jew to 
Christianity. As has been shown, however, 
this simple, Manichaean picture is broken 
by Shylock and Launcelot, who disrupt the 
logic of the comic plot with unexpected 
insights. Antonio’s melancholy throughout 
the play is also a break in the comic logic of 
the plot insofar as it “keeps up” something 
in the air. For me, it is another privileged 
moment in the play -  full of drama and, 
perhaps, tragic.
I resist looking at The Merchant as a 
simple comedy. Taking Antonio and Shylock 
as the center of my discussion, we find at the 
end of the play two “close” characters. They 
remain solitary: Antonio still melancholic 
and Shylock defeated. Two (and too) strangers 
to the final tableau of loving scenes, two 
outsiders. Shylock does not belong to Venetian 
society at ali; Antonio does not belong to 
the world of consummated love, of marriage. 
Indeed, these two lonely men and the 
circumstances of their loneliness lead us to 
(re)think The Merchant, not as a comedy, but 
neither exactly as a tragedy.
We could conclude that the identity of 
the play remains (or not) ambiguous because 
of the ambiguous (or not) identity of Shylock 
and Antonio (which I will discuss in the
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following section). Or maybe, considering 
that identity implies a reflective attitude, the 
comic in the play has to look to the tragic in 
order to recognize itself as comic. If so, then 
comic and tragic are dramatically committed 
to each other.
THE (AM BIG UOU S) IDENTITY OF 
ANTONIO AND SHYLOCK
Portia. I am informed throughly of the cause. 
Which is the merchant here? And which the 
Jew? (Act IV, scene i)
I have already discussed Antonio and 
Shylock, who can be seen conventionally as 
two an tagonists, but d ram atica lly  as 
committed to each other. In the first case, 
Jew and Christian, egoist and generous, 
bloodsucking m oneylender and intrepid 
merchant, rude and gentle, they divide 
preferences (among the audience), raise 
laughs, and disdain one another. These are 
men who could never be fellows (Kameraden, 
camaradas, camarades, comrades) because 
they share nothing. In the origin of these 
words there is Kamára, a place under which 
people who live their lives become involved, 
become kameraden, camaradas, camarades, 
com rades. Cam araderie or comradeship 
means to share the same place, the same food, 
the same drink, and the same faith. And 
Shylock is aware of its “sacred” meaning:
Shylock. Yes, to smiell pork, to eat of the 
habitation which your prophet the Nazarite 
conjured the devil into! I will buy with you, 
sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, 
and so following; but I will not eat with you, 
drink with you, nor pray with you. What news 
on the Rialto? Who is he comes here? (ActI, 
scene iii)
Shylock and Antonio do not eat, drink, 
and pray together because “en fait, tout 
oppose les deux hommes: Tun est calculateur, 
Tautre généreux et même prodigue, Tun 
thésaurise, Tautre dépense, Shylock bâtit sa 
fortune sur la raison et la possession, Tautre 
risque la sienne dans folies aventures.”28 
Nevertheless, they buy and sell with each 
other; business is permissible. Business (and 
not friendship) requires formalities, which in 
turn imply rules: the rules of Venice. Antonio, 
for the sake of his love for Bassanio, has to 
do business with Shylock and a bond is made: 
three thousand ducats to be paid in three 
months; otherwise:
Shylock. ... if you repay me not on such day, 
In such a place, such sum or sums are 
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit 
Be nominated for an equal pound- 
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken 
In what part of your body pleaseth me. (Act I, 
scene iii)
It is certainly a diabolical bond, as 
Antonio remarks:
Antonio. Mark you this, Bassanio,
The devil can cite scripture for his purpose. 
An evil soul producing holy witness 
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek,
A goodly apple rotten at the heart.
O what a goodly outside falsehood hath! 
(Act I, scene iii)
Nevertheless, Antonio agrees to the bond, 
and so makes a pact with the ‘deviT (just 
like Faust). Traditionally, in the realm of 
private law, a bond between two persons 
becomes the law for (and between) the parties, 
who take the risk of this anticipation of the
28 OST, François, Temps et contract. Critique du 
pacte faustien. Annales de D ro it  de Louvain,  n. 59 
(1 9 9 9 ), 1-2: 21.
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future (the contract, the bond). For Shylock, 
law is the absolute condition for leading a 
decent life, while for Antonio it is the minimum 
condition; it is an inadequate guide for life 
because it is indifferent to persons.29 Thus, 
for Shylock the bond assumes an absolute 
authority, while for Antonio it is not absolute 
yet it has authority. These two opposite men 
are, then, tied not by friendship but by the 
bond, the law.
Comically and/or tragically, Antonio 
breaks the law, the bond, when he is unable 
to pay Shylock the money he borrowed at 
the stipulated time. Once he breaks the law 
that tied them, their different worldviews 
become even more radically opposed.
Antonio irresponsibly forged the instrument 
of his own punishment in accepting the flesh- 
bond. Shylock sadistically and resentfully 
seeks the realization of the law. On the one 
hand, there is the law (a bond) which is unjust 
in its terms -  and, because of this, could be 
reconsidered. On the other hand, there is the 
spirit (and the will) of revenge. To accept the 
revocability of the forfeit, of the pound of 
flesh, means to accept the tangible force of 
the bond/law and its mutability. But for 
Shylock, the force of the law relies on its 
immutability:
Shylock. ... The pound of flesh which I demand
of him
Is dearly bought, is mine. and I will have it.
If you deny me, fie upon your law!
There is no force in the decrees of Venice.
I stand for judgment. Answer; shall I have it?
(Act IV, scene i)
29 BLOOM, A. Shakespeare’s Politics. Chicago:
Chicago U niversity Press, 1998, p. 18.
Shylock. My deeds upon my head! I crave 
the law,
The penalty and forfeit of my bond.
Instead, the bond/law “loin d’évoluer au 
bénéfice de la collaboration des partenaires, 
il se fige dans 1’exécution mécanique d’une 
vengeance prémdéditée.”30
Shylock. To bait fish withal. If it will feed 
nothing else, it will feed my revenge. He hath 
disgraced me, and hindTed me half a million, 
laughed at my looses, mocked at my gains, 
scorned my nation, thwarted my bargains, 
cooled my friends, heated mine enemies-sand 
what's his reason? I am a Jew.... And if you 
wrong us, shall we not revenge? ... (Act III, 
scene i)
Shylock is asked by the Duke and by Portia 
to show his mercy and remorse, and thus to 
forgive the merchant, to which he replies:
Shylock. On what compulsion must I [be 
merciful]? Tell me that. (Act IV, scene i)
That is the question Shakespeare’s genius 
brings out: why should one be merciful 
and forgive?
The answer to this question reaches the 
limits of one’s (our) humanity. In the play, it 
reaches the limit of Shylock’s humanity. But 
his human condition somehow makes it 
impossible to respond to that demand: he 
does not eat, drink, or pray with Antonio. 
There is no friendship/camaraderie/humanity 
between them, but hatred, rancor, humiliation, 
and a bond/the law. To forgive is to challenge 
the iireversibility of law and the irreversibility 
of time by the fact that, in forgiving, what is 
done can be reversed; one is able to undo 
what is done.
3° Temps et  contrac t.  Cri t ique  du pa c te
faus tien ,  p .22.
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To such a difficult and almost impossible 
task of forgiving in the realm of (their/our) 
mundane affairs, the only solution is (or has 
to be) equally impossible: to venture in a trial 
in which the judge is not a judge but a 
disguised woman, in which a civil lawsuit 
ends in a criminal conviction against the 
plaintiff and a Jew is converted into Christian.
As we can see, there is no possible solution 
to Shylock and Antonio’s antagonism. With 
both their relationship and their business, the 
solution is its improbability. To forgive, then, 
is as impossible as the trial Shakespeare 
shows us. Voilà, Shakespeare’s revelation! 
At this point, I must return to the second of my 
considerations about Antonio and Shylock’s 
dramatic commitment.
At the beginning of this section, I said 
that Antonio and Shylock should be seen as 
dramatically committed to each other. From 
this point of view, they are seen as sharing 
the same fate: two outsiders, two strange men 
in a hostile society in which they end up 
being lonely (as they always were). In his 
joylessness, w ifelessness, and essential 
solitariness, Antonio is almost the Christian 
mirror of Shylock: “Each has to make a 
gesture against being overwhelmed.... The 
Jew makes his offer of friendship, he tries to 
escape from isolation by means of the only 
common link betw een him self and his 
enemies, his wealth. Antonio makes his 
gesture of sacrifice in entering upon a bond, 
through the only thing, which really means 
anything to him, his love.... Each makes his 
gesture and each is defeated . ...”31
31 M ID G L E Y , T he M erch an t o f  V enice: A
R econsideration, p .204.
Shakespeare wisely and ironically makes 
them close to each other because there is no 
proximity/friendship between them. Poitia, 
who is also wise, raises the crucial question: 
“Which is the merchant here? And which the 
Jew?” She lives in Belmont, but she knows 
Venice, a place of curious and enigmatic 
personal identities, a place of masks. Identity 
is at stake! We are (re)turned to Antonio, to 
the beginning of the play and to the cause of 
ali this drama: “In sooth I know not why I am 
so sad.... I have much ado to know myself.”
This dramatic statement recurs through 
the play. Antonio and Shylock, the Christian 
and the Jew, are the characters on whom this 
paper has mostly focused. This does not mean 
that they are the most important characters 
in the play, but they do embody the ambiguous 
types I want to explore, the dramatic and 
onerous ambiguity that somehow ascribes 
excitement and fear, pleasure and pain, to those 
who experience it. That is, the indeterminacy 
and insecürity of who and what one (we) is 
(are), is (re)presented in the narrative of The 
Merchant o f Venice. Sypher points out that: 
“Greek and Elizabethan playwrights alike 
indicate that drama thrives on uncertainties 
in ages when the foundations of belief havé 
been unsettled, where there are competing 
readings of experience, when logic has reached 
a point of diminishing retums.”32 Shakespeare’ s 
characters are full of complexities like those we 
encounter in living persons and that makes it 
difficult, for instance, to classify most people 
as either hero or villain.
Perhaps Shakespeare did not think of an 
ambiguous Shylock or an ambiguous Antonio
32 SYPHER, The Ethic o f  the Time, p.3.
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as he wrote the play. But to be in a plot, to 
become entangled, is a living experience. If 
we look to Shakespeare’s theatre as such (as 
a living experience), and especially to The 
Merchant o f Venice, an ambiguous Shylock 
and Antonio are allowed by our imagination; 
otherwise this would not be a (comic or 
tragic) drama.
(THE AMBIGUITY OF) THE LETTER OF 
THE LAW THAT EQUALS LAW THAT 
EQUALS JU STIC E THAT EQUALS 
REVENGE
Q u el le  d i j f é r e n c e  y  a - t - i l  e n t r e  d ' u n e p a r t  la 
fo r c e  q u i  p e u t  ê t r e  ju s t e ,  en  to u s  c a s  j u g é e  
légi time,  non  se u le m e n t  V in s tr u m en la n  Service  
du d r o i t  m a is  V e x e r c i c e  e t  V a c c o m p l i s s e m e n t  
mêm e, V e s s e n c e  d u  dro i t ,  e t  d ’a u t r e  p a r t  la 
v io lence  qu. ’o n j u g e  to u jo u r s  in ju s te ?  (D errida, 
Force  o f L a w , p. 9 2 7 )
The dramatic (and ambiguous) experience 
of being Antonio and Shylock leads the two 
characters to another, no less dram atic 
experience: being in/for/before the law. What 
places law at stake in The Merchant o f Venice 
is the sentiment of revenge. Posner, quoting 
Holmes, says: “law grows out of revenge.”33 
Indeed, some legal doctrines were based on 
revenge; the history of law cannot ignore this 
fact. The whole idea of retribution in criminal 
law, in the sense that the punishment has to 
be proportionate to the wrong the aggressor/ 
defendant has done -  retaliation for a wrong -  
has its origin in revenge. To some extent, law 
has replaced revenge when it takes the conflict
33 POSNER, R. Law and Literature. Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard U niversity Press, 1998, 
p.49.
from the private to the public sphere in order 
to render it rational and institutionalized. 
Indeed, when people are not able to handle 
their own conflicts they appeal to the 
“authoritative”34 instance of law in order to 
find a “rational”35 resolution. Revenge is 
somehow the antithesis of rational thinking 
insofar as it is emotional, destructive, and 
passionate. Law has (among other things) this 
pretentious task of rendering rational/ 
reasonable one’s (our) conflicting concerns, 
emotions, and passions. If and how it does 
this are issues which run throughout this 
paper. Clearly, replacing revenge through 
institutionalized forms of retribution or 
composition does not mean that it will no 
longer occur. Law replaces it as a 
(institutionalized) system, but not as a feeling.
A ccording to Posner: “ [l]iterary
depictions of revenge can tell us something 
about revenge and about issues of law and 
justice that revenge adjoins or subtends; the 
lawyer’s and social scientist’s analyses of 
revenge can tell us som ething about 
literature.”36 In The Merchant o f Venice, the 
flesh-bond story is a story of revenge as well 
as forgiveness. Looking narrowly at its legal
34 The discussion on the authority o f law is as 
en d less as the d iscu ssio n  on the authority o f  the 
R ule o f  law. In very general term s “w e ” c itizen s  
consent in such authority in order to escape from a 
co n d itio n  o f  ab so lu te  m istrust in w h ich  “b e llum  
omniuin contra  omnes.  ”
35 To act r a tio n a lly  or rea so n a b ly  d o es not 
necessarily  mean that w rongs w ill not be done or 
that law/rights w ill be respected and enforced. For 
exam p le, N azi G erm any, fa sc ist  Italy, and South  
Am erican dictatorships ali acted under the name o f  
the Rule o f Law, cases in w h ich the R ule o f  Law  
cam ouflaged  tyranny.
36 POSNER, Law and Literature, p.49.
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im plications, there is a loan formalized 
through a bond -  a legal instrument intended 
to regulate a commercial deal -  with a clause 
pledging a pound of flesh as a security against 
a default. Shylock, the moneylender, and 
Antonio, the borrower, agree with the terms 
of the bond and so the deal is settled. As I 
have said elsewhere, Shylock and Antonio, 
Jew and Christian, do not eat with each other, 
do not share anything expect the sentiment 
of animosity, but still they negotiate with 
each other. Antonio is unable to pay Shylock 
at the stipulated time since his ships are lost 
at sea, and so the loan goes into default. 
Shylock, who hates Antonio and whose 
daughter flew with a Christian taking his 
jewels and his dignity, brings suit to enforce 
the bond, the law. Indeed, Shylock wants 
revenge and he brings suit to (en)force the 
bond, the law: a pound of flesh to be cut and 
taken from Antonio.
Shylock. ... If you prick us, do we not bleed? If 
you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison 
us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall 
we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, 
we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a 
Christian, what is his humility? Revenge! If a 
Christian wrong a Jew, what should his 
sufferance be by Christian example? Why 
revenge! The villainy you teach me I will 
execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the 
instruction. (Act III, scene i)
Shylock. Fll have my bond! Speaknot against 
my bond!
I have sworn an oath that I will have my bond. 
Thou cair dst me dog before thou hadst a cause, 
But since I am a dog, beware my fangs.
The Duke shall grant me justice. ...(Act III, 
scene iii)
For Shylock, revenge and the enforcement 
of his bond mean (to do) justice. Suddenly, 
there is not revenge, a bond, and justice, but
rather one and the same thing that can be 
(called) either revenge or bond (law) or 
justice. For Shylock, like for most people, 
(the idea of) the letter of the law implies (the 
idea of) law, which in its turn, implies (the 
idea of) justice. Posner remarks that: “[t]he 
lack of realism in the play’s treatment of law 
extends to the procedures as well as the 
substance of law.”37 That is, the improbability 
of legal technicalities in the play concerning 
Renaissance law is obvious, but this is not 
the point. Shakespeare was not concerned 
with legal technicalities but with drama, 
which is there in Shylock’s faith in the letter 
of the law, in this strict legality justified by a 
legal formalism to accomplish an unjust 
end -  the letter of the law that equals law 
that equals justice that equals revenge.
Shylock has a bond, which literally says 
that a pound of flesh is to be cut and taken 
from Antonio. He believes in the authority of 
the bond, the law, to the same extent that he 
believes in the authority of the Old Testament: 
“an eye for an eye.” The same literality allows 
Portia to understand that if a drop of blood 
were spilled, Shylock would be attempting to 
take the life of a Venetian Citizen and thus 
committing an even worse crime.
Portia shows that interpretation is at stake 
in law and, more specifically, in adjudication. 
In the trial she seems to act reasonably and
37 Ibid., p. 106-7. For instance, the fact that at 
that tim e in Venice, “a defaulting borrower had the 
right to recover his forfeited property by com ing up 
with the money is due on the loan, even if it is overdue, 
within a reasonable tim e.” A real court would also 
lead Shylock and A ntonio to an agreem ent once it 
had obtained A n ton io ’s o ffer to double S h y lo ck ’s 
p rincip al. T he trial, w ith  a d isg u ise d  ju d ge  and 
without lawyers for the parties, is another improbable
legal technicality.
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with equity, recognizing that strict rules of 
law, however necessary to a well-ordered 
society, must be applied with sensitivity so 
that the spirit of the law is not sacrificed 
unnecessarily to its letter. Shylock is aware 
of his status as an alien in Venetian society 
and hence he is attached to the letter of the 
law as protection against judicial discretion 
that could be exercised  against him. 
“A punctilious legalism  is the pariah’s 
protection.”38 If, on the other hand, Shylock 
had appealed to the ‘spirit’ of the law instead 
of its literality, he would have had a better 
argument to enforce his bond. Therefore, 
Portia wisely argues that rules of commerce 
in Venice must be observed and, as such, any 
agreement made according to these rules 
must be enforced.
Portia. It must not be. There is no power 
in Venice
Can alter a decree established.
‘Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error by the same example 
Will rush into the State. It cannot be. (Act IV, 
scene I)
“A Daniel come to judgment! Yes, a 
Daniel!/ O wise young judge, how do honor 
thee!,” the Jew replies. She thus gains his 
confidence in her legal skills and, relying on 
the same argument, says that: “(t)his bond 
doth give thee here no jot of blood;/ The 
words expressly are ‘a pound of flesh’....” 
As we can see, Portia moves from an argument 
appealing to Shylock’s sensitivity, asking 
him to forgive Antonio, to an argument 
which was Shylock’s own and which appeals 
to the letter of law -  but with a difference: 
Portia has the force, the authority. Whatever
38 Ibid., p.lio.
equitable, good, and just intentions Portia 
has in preventing the enforcement of the 
absurd bond, she is a disguised judge and 
also an interested party in the case. And she 
acts as such, that is, without the impartiality 
a judge must have.
Portia thus transforms a trial based on a 
civil suit into a criminal conviction against 
Shylock, since he, after ali, attempted to take 
the life of a Venetian citizen. She arranges 
for things to come out right through a series 
of none-too-honest stratagems.
On the one hand, Portia’s verdict satisfies 
the comedy, assuring a conventional happy 
ending in Belmont. On the other hand, it 
satisfies the purpose of this paper, showing 
that law through its force aims at channeling 
different self-interests to a common ground 
of (possible) reconciliation supported by 
norms, rules, and standards,39 but that this 
possibility is, inevitably, dramatic.
To recount the story of The Merchant o f 
Venice is to venture into a complex web of 
conflicts in which the characters weave their 
identities not just as subjects, but also as 
‘legal’ subjects. Questioning, complicating, 
destabilizing, bringing out paradoxes and 
ambiguities, showing the “illuminations” of the 
plot through Antonio and Shylock -  subjects, 
subjects of law, subjects of morality, juridical 
and moral persons -  is to problematize law and 
justice. Or, rather, as Derrida points out, it is 
“[u]n questionement sur les fondements du 
droit, de la morale et de la politiqueT40
39 ROSENFELD, M. New Legal Formalism. In: 
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBLITY OF 
JUSTICE. Cardozo Law Review. (11) 5-6, july/aug. 
1990, p. 1266.
40 DERRIDA, Force of law. In: Ibid., p.931.
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A flesh-bond is the link between Antonio 
and Shylock. The paradox, then, is introduced 
at the beginning: this link is fated to its 
dissolütion and (or because of) a bond whose 
enforcem ent is fatal. We paradoxically 
experience the same fatality when “we” 
subscribe to a contract in order to have a 
“better” life in political and civil society, 
w hich in turn are the outcom e of our 
individual and egoistic  w ill (how ever 
intended to provide us a “better” life). We 
are fated in the modern liberal-bourgeois 
state to a constitutive egoistic will, which is 
our own, to render us a “better” life in a “well- 
ordered” society; a will that, according to 
Hobbes, is either desiderium or appetitus and, 
as such, ambiguous and antagonistic.
Hobbes, who exemplifies this understanding, 
asserts: “the mutual transferring of right, is 
that which men call CONTRACT.”41 The 
contract assumes the form of a pact or 
covenant (or bond) in a sense that “one of 
the contractors, may deliver the thing 
contracted for on his part, and leave the other 
to perform  his part at some determined 
tim e after, and in the m ean tim e be 
trusted.”42 According to Hobbes, contracts 
are communicated through signs, which can 
be either express or tacit: “Express are words 
spoken with understanding of what they 
signify: and such words are either of the time 
present, or past; as, 1 give, I grant, I have 
given, Ihave granted, 1 will that this be yours: 
or of the future; as, I will give, I will grant: 
w hich words of the fu ture are called
41 HOBBES, T. Leviatkan. On the matter, form 
and power of a commonwealth ecclesiasticall and 
civil. New York: Touchstone, 1997. p. 106.
42 Ibid., p.106.
PROMISE.”43 In this sense, signs of contract 
are words of the past, present, and future. It is 
not by chance that ‘will’ is the key word to 
signify H obbes’s or even Shylock and 
Antonio’s contract. ‘Will,’ on the one hand, 
signifies a present act of the will (one’s or 
our will) and, on the other hand, a promise of 
an act of the will to come. And Hobbes 
continues: “because ali contract is mutual 
translation or change of right; and therefore 
he that promiseth only, because he hath 
already received the benefit for which he 
prom iseth, is to be understood as if he 
intended the right should pass: for unless he 
had been content to have his words so 
understood, the other would not have 
performed his part first. And for that cause, 
in buying, and selling, and other acts of 
contract, a prom ise is equ ivalent to a 
covenant; and therefore obligatory.”44 In 
willing (the moment of the contract), one will 
do such and such (the moment of promises). 
Hobbes’s depiction of the ‘State of Nature’ 
is of a society where one is not able to make 
promises. Therefore, in the ‘State of Nature’ 
no contracts or covenants or bonds would be 
valid. For Hobbes, a ‘state’ where one is able 
to make promises and to accomplish them is, 
first, the outcome of one’s individual will 
(in the present), by means of which a contract 
is settled. This latter is then itself an act of 
deliberation, i.e., an act of will (in the future).
Yet, precisely here resides Shylock’s and 
Antonio’s (and^our) drama: this will, which 
signifies the contract, can, according to 
Hobbes, be understood either as desire or
43 Ibid., p.106.
44 Ibid., p. 107.
76
appetite. According to the first understanding, 
desire comes from the verb desidero which, 
in its turn, comes from the noun sidus 
(singular)/sidera (plural). Sidera means the 
figures m ade by groups of stars, i.e ., 
constellations. Sidera thus lead to the heights. 
Desiderare means to abandon the heights or 
be abandoned by them. Desiderium is the 
decision of taking our destiny in our own 
hands and desire is the conscious will 
obtained from  deliberation . How ever, 
Desiderium also means a loss, a privation, a 
lack. Thus, desire is, on the one hand, 
decision, deliberation, and, on the other 
hand, lack, privation, loss< Hobbes says: “that 
which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: 
and to HATE those things for which they have 
aversion. So that desire and love are the same 
thing; save that by desire, we always signify 
the absence of the object; by love, most 
commonly the presence of the same.”45 The 
will as desire cannot escape the ambiguity 
that constitutes and defines it as well as the 
fatality of losing or lacking. Still following 
Hobbes, the will can equally be expressed 
by appetitu s : “In deliberation, the last 
appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering 
to the action, or to the omission thereof, is 
that we call WILL; the act, not the faculty, o f 
willing.”46 Appetitus comes from appeto 
which comes from peto, that is, to go to, to 
attack, to go to seek, to pursue -  followed or 
not by violence. It also has to do with 
soliciting, to demand (at law). Appeto, then, 
implies to attack, to pursue,' to solicit. But 
Appetitus is also a natural desire to satisfy
our hunger and thirst. On the one hand there 
is ac ti vi ty: attacking, pursuing and soliciting; 
on the other there is passivity: need, lack.
In fact, every situation of will, desire, or 
appetite is dramatic, anguished... This is true, 
following Hobbes, for the modern State, 
formally known as the Rule of Law, as it is 
for Shylock and Antonio. For Hobbes, justice 
comes from the accomplishment of the 
contract, and only a coercive power, through 
punishment, could compel men equally to 
perform their contracts. For Shylock as well, 
justice means claiming his bond and for this 
reason he appeals to the court of justice of 
Venice (to [en]force the law): “There is no 
force in the decrees of Venice!” This is a case 
(perhaps there is no other) of law and justice 
implying force, an authorized force which 
“se justifie ou qui est justifiée à s ’appliquei; 
même si cette justification peut être jugée 
d ’autre part injuste ou injustifiable.”47 And 
if it is the case as it is for Hobbes and Shylock 
that justice is to accomplish the law through 
an authorized force then, justice (when it 
becomes law) has to imply such force. In 
adressing Portia, Jessica says,
Jessica. (...) If law, authority, and power
deny not,
It will go hard with poor Antonio.
With an excessive and unauthorized 
force, we would be back to a situation of 
private vengeance. For Shylock, Justice is 
equal to Law that is equal to what is written, 
i.e., the bond/rule: justice as law, law as rule, 
rule as justice.
Nevertheless, this is not the case for 
Antonio. Derrida puts it nicely when he says
45 Ibid., p .48 . _________________
46 Ibid., p .54. 47 DER R ID A , Force o f  law, p.925.
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that, “je veux tout de suite et encore insister 
pour réserver la possibilité d ’une justice, 
voire d ’une loi qui non seulement excède ou 
contredit le droit mais qui peut-être n ’a pas 
de rapport avec le droit, ou entretient avec 
lui un rapport si étrange qu ’elle peut aussi 
bien exiger du droit que V exclure”. Yet 
Portia’s arguments to release Antonio from 
his penalty are not realistic in the sense of 
their legal technicalities, they show the gap 
that (may) exist between justice and law in a 
strictus sensu, that is, as rule/norm and how 
contradictory they can be.
Thus, for Antonio justice runs in the 
opposite way, that is, in not performing the 
bond -  perhaps in the same way for those 
who refuse to perform the contract in the 
liberal-bourgeois State. It is the case of justice 
con trad ic ting  law, where the la tte r is 
conceived as what is written, the bond/rule.
Shylock and Antonio lead us to conclude 
with Derrida that justice is an experience of 
the impossible: “Une volonté, un désii; une 
exigence de justice dont la structure ne serait 
pas une expérience de Vaporie n yaurait 
aucune chance d ’être ce qu’elle est, à savoir 
just appel de la justice. Chaque fois que les 
choses passent ou se passent bien, chaque 
fo is  q u ’on applique tranquillem ent une 
bonne règle à un cas particulier, à un 
example correctment subsumé, selon un 
jugement déterminant, on peut être sur que 
le droit y trouve peut être son compte mais 
certainement pas la justice.”4*
Finally, Shylock and Antonio convince 
me of the complicity among philosophy, law,
48 Ibid.,  p .946 .
justice and literature. Due to the predominance 
of legal formalism, especially legal positivism, 
in the study of law, law schools have not been 
the place to raise, discuss, and experience 
the aporias that are constitutive of law as 
such, i.e., as aporias. A paradigm of positive 
Science has informed legal theory so that the 
study of law has been bound by a narrow 
conception of law as a system of norms/rules. 
Thus, neither the aporias nor the theoretical 
approaches that bring them out have been 
taken into account. But perhaps I should 
rewrite the last sentences in the simple past 
tense, as there are some new ‘critica i’ 
approaches of and in law committed to 
(re)think it in other terms than the ones of 
legal positivism. This is, for instance, the case 
of Criticai Legal Studies (CLS) and their 
deconstructive  attitude, which offer a 
promising alternative for rethinking legal 
theory. D errida points out that “ les 
développements des ‘criticai legal studies’ 
ou des trauvaux, comme ceux de Stanley 
Fish, Barbara Herrstein-Smith, Drucilla 
Cornell, Sam Weber et d ’autres, qui se 
situent à Varticulation entre la literature, 
la philosophie, le droit et les problèmes 
politico-institutionels, sont aujourd’hui, du 
point du vue d ’une certaine déconstruction, 
parm i les p lus féconds et les p lus  
nécessaires.”49 After ali, Criticai Legal 
Studies do not remain enclosed in pure 
speculative, theoretical, academic discourses, 
but engaged in a project to intervene in and 
change the world.
49 Ibid., p .939.
78
LAW AND LITERATURE:
THE IMPOSSIBLE IN ITS POSSIBILITY AND 
THE POSSIBLE AS ITS IMPOSSIBLITY
Impossibility is not the opposite of possible:
impossibility releases the possible.
(R. Beardsworth, Derrida and the political)
I have been stressing the ambiguities and 
contradictions that are at the origin of law -  
specially positive law -  through the discussion 
on the Merchant o f Venice and, finally, I 
came to Derrida’s consideration of law as an 
aporia. In fact, this could instead be (at) the 
beginning of the paper: law is an aporia. But 
the movement of the paper (and mine as well), 
however motivated by the relation between 
law and literature, could not be otherwise 
but from a looking for am biguities and 
contradictions in law (through literature) and 
in literature (through law) to, then, the aporias 
that constitute both: law and literature.
“What if the law, without being itself 
transfixed by literature, shared the same 
conditions of its possibility with the literary 
object?”50 If law and literature share the same 
conditions of possibility it means that the 
origin of law is also that of literature, which 
is, after ali, a non-origin. A story as a kind of 
relation is “linked to the law that it relates, 
appearing, in so doing, before the law, which 
appears before it.” 51 Accordingly, law should 
not bring up any story unless it is without 
history and origin. As Derrida asserts, this is 
the law of the laws -  moral, judicial, political, 
natural etc. “What remains concealed and 
invisible in each law is thus presumably the
50 DER RID A, Acts  o f  literature,  p .191.
51 Ibid., p .191.
law itself, that which makes laws of theses 
laws, the being-law of these laws.”52 Thus, 
law appears and interferes but detached from 
any origin, that is, “(i)t appears as something 
that does not appear as such in the course of 
a history. At ali events it cannot be constituted 
by some history that might give rise to any 
story.”53
As we can see, the origin of the law is not 
an event but it is not pure fiction either. It is 
neither history nor fantasy but the law; the 
law of the laws and this is the aporia of law. 
“The aporia of law occupies the middle 
ground between reality and fiction, opening 
up the distinction , but alw ays already 
exceeding its terms.54 An aporia is, then, this 
non-chemin which we cannot experience, 
this impossible in its possibility and possible 
as its impossibility.
For the aporia is also the law of literature. 
According to Derrida, literature is a kind of 
discourse that identifies its source of writing 
to be ‘within’ the aporia. Literature asseverates 
the non-origin of the origin of the law that is 
reinscribed as both the content and the event 
of the text. The non-advent of the law is the 
advent of a text. Then, law and literature 
come together in this impossibility of the 
account of the origin of law. The possibility 
of Shylock forgiving relies on its impossibility 
otherwise it would not be the case of forgiveness. 
It is this possibility as impossibility which 
literature witnesses.
52 Ibid., p .192.
53 Ibid., p .194.
54 B eard sw orth , R ichard. D e r r id a  a n d  the  
pol i t ica l .  p .34 -35 .
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The very characteristic of law is to be 
universal,55 that is, accessible to everyone 
and at ali times but, essentially, it is not. It is 
then impossible to accede directly to the law, 
which is never immediately at hand. In 
Derrida words, “the very universality of the 
law exceeds ali finite boundaries and thus 
carries this risk”.56 In fact,Jaw as well as 
literature, imply this ambivalent relation 
between the general and the singular. To the 
universality of law there is the singularity 
engendered by its enforceability. To the 
universality of a literary text -  of what it 
narrates -  there is its singular status as one 
and the only one (author(ity), copyrights etc).
A story does not tell or describe anything 
but itself as text to which it is impossible to 
accede in its proper significance. “The text 
guards itself, maintains itself-like the law, 
speaking only of itself, that is to say, of its 
non-identity with itself. It neither arrives nor 
lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the 
law and leaves the reader before the law.”57
Therefore, as well as the law, a text is not 
immediately accessible. Accordingly, a clear 
and graspable sense remains as hidden in its 
origin. Fiction of narration as well as fiction 
as narration is the (non)origin of literature. 
The non-origin of the literary text (or the law)
55 As Derrida points out, Kant’s moral law and 
the respect it calls for is due only to the moral law  
itse lf “w hich never sh ow s itse lf  but it is the only  
cause o f that resp ect” . Derrida is a lso  concerned  
with the “as i f ’ of the categorical imperative which, 
according to him, “enables us to reconcile practical 
reason  w ith  h isto r ica l t e le o lo g y  and w ith  the  
possib ility  o f unlim ited progress” . See  D ER R ID A , 
Acts o f  literature, p. 190.
56 Ibid., p .196.
57 Ibid., p .211.
does not diminish the necessity of what it 
tells (its law). Therefore, in order to reach the 
law and stand before it, face to face with 
respect, or to introduce oneself to it and into 
it the story becomes the impossible story of 
the impossible.58
The access to the law (and literature) is 
always a mediated access as we cannot reach 
it but only have relation with the law ’s 
representatives who are at the same time its 
interrupters and its emissaries. “We must 
remain ignorant of who or what or where the 
law is, we must not know who it is or what it 
is, where and how it presents itself, whence it 
comes and whence it speaks. This is what 
must be before the m ust o f the law.”59 
According to Derrida, to be before the law is 
to be a subject of the law in appearing before 
it but what can either mean to not have access 
to the law, to be outside the law (an outlaw). 
He/she is neither under the law nor in the law. 
He/she is both, a subject of the law and an outlaw. 
Accordingly, Shylock (and also Antonio) 
remain subjects of the law and outlaws.
This is the law of the law, the process of a 
law whose subject it is here and there. After 
ali, we do not know what the law is, who it is 
and where it is. “It is a thing, a person, a 
discourse, a voice, a document, or simply 
nothing that incessantly defers access to 
itself, thus forbidding itself in order to become 
something or someone. ... This nullification 
gives birth to the law, before as before and 
before as behind.”60
58 Ibid., p. 1 9 9 -200 .
59 Ibid., p .204.
60 Ibid., p .2 08-9 .
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Well, law and literature experiences an 
aporetic relation, the same relation that 
Derrida finds in justice. In fact this is the 
point. This whole discussion on law and 
literature arrives at a tempting and equally 
aporetic idea of justice to which legal theory 
should commit itself if it aspires, somehow, 
to intervene and change the world. An idea 
of justice that must guide our actions in the 
sense of o n e’s responsibility  in taking 
decisions (in enforcing the law in the case of 
judicial officials such as judges), an idea of 
justice as aporia: “Une aporie, c ’est un non- 
chemin. La justice serait de ce point de vue 
Vexpérience de ce dont nous ne pouvonsfaire 
Vexpérience... je  crois qu ’il n ’y a pas de 
justice sans cette expérience, tout impossible 
qiVelle est, de Vaporie. La justice est une 
experience de Vimpossible. Une volonté, un 
desii; une exigence de justice dont la structure 
ne serait pas une expérience de Vaporie 
n ’aurait aucune chance d ’être ce qu’elle est, 
à savoir juste appel de la justice. ”61
This is not a messianic statement. It rather 
is a commitment that legal theory -  legal 
theorists, philosophers of law, judicial 
officials, professors of law, legal professionals, 
etc. -  should have: to (co)llaborate to a better 
(more equal, radically democratic and fairer) 
world. And Deconstruction is a ‘possible’ 
attitude for legal theory to do so. As Sam Weber 
nicely puts it, “what seems characteristic of 
the transferential place and history in which 
deconstruction is engaged, is that the transfer 
between  languages -  be they so-called 
“natural” or national languages, or to be they 
the discourse of individual “disciplines” -
becomes dependent upon the transfers going 
on w ithin  their borders. Such in ternai 
transference tends to uncover ‘hidden 
articulations ... within assumedly monadic 
totalities’, and thus to open the possibility, 
and process of turning themselves, as it were, 
inside-out.”62
VENICE’S STREETS AND BELMONT’S 
NIGHTINGALES SERENADE
Portia. It is almost morning,
And yet I am sure you are not satisfied 
Of these events at full. Let us go in,
And charge us there upon inter'gatories 
And we will answer ali things faithfully. 
(Act V, scene i)
To bring a paper to an end is to 
acknowledge, just like in a trial (in some 
Latin languages, such as Portuguese, the 
word for trial is “judgement”), that a whole 
exhausting process has preceded it. Many 
things have been said, others have been 
passed in silence and based on both of them, 
sounds and silence, a sentence is pronounced. 
The content of the sentence, the décision, is 
the outcome of who interpreted such sounds 
and silence. The Merchant o f Venice and this 
paper (n)either ends in Venice nor in Belmont 
but in (and by) my interpretation. For this 
reason, trials (judgements) and papers can 
be so controversial. Looking from this point 
of view a scaring but exciting sensation of 
uncertainty arises. Then, we forge instruments 
to deal with controversies and uncertainties 
that they produce. Such instruments are not 
to get rid of them but simply to deal with 
them in a certain way. To interpret The
61 D ER R ID A , Force de loi, p .946. 62 WEBER, In the name o f  the law, p. 1515-1516.
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Merchant o f Venice with a deconstructivê 
attitude is the instrument I chose.
C onflicts, am biguities, paradoxes, 
aporias drove my reading of Shakespeare’ s 
verses and prose. I was very much concerned 
with them as they carry the idea of what the 
dramatic is. Some Shakespearean scholars say 
that The Merchant of Venice is a legal play; 
I reply (sort of agreeing), it is a play about 
conflicts, ambiguities, paradoxes, aporias. 
Indeed, I am just reaffirming the same thing. 
From this perspective, law is dramatic and 
any attempt to preclude conflicts, ambiguities, 
paradoxes, and aporias sacrifices law, justice, 
and democracy.
Most of the people blame law (and its 
Science) for being conservative. If a non- 
conservative understanding is to succeed law 
must be rescued from its isolation and be 
engaged in an ethical and political project. 
Deconstruction is a seductive, criticai and 
responsible attitude to such rescuing.
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